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bavarde et hystérique qui ne sait que sauter à la corde . . . et prononcer des paroles sonores, vide de sens et jamais suivies d'actes". The way in which Trotski pulled off the *coup d'état* of November 7 fills the author with admiration. "Pas un accroc, pas une bavure, le gouvernement est renversé sans avoir eu le temps de faire 'Ouf'." Trotski is not a dreamer; "il voit clair, il ne se trompe pas . . . il n'y a rien de vague et de rêveur dans son regard".

Considerable space is devoted to the relations of the Soviet government with the Allies and their representatives. As to the part played by the United States during these trying times, Mr. Anet has this to say: "Quand l'ambassadeur [of the United States] disait blanc, l'attaché militaire disait noir, et un extraordinaire colonel Robbins, chef de la Croix Rouge, personne quasi-officiel, disait rouge, rouge sang."

Scattered here and there through the volumes are chapters dealing with the economic and social life during the revolution, with the suffering of the people as a whole, and with the humiliation of the army officers and the bourgeoisie as a class. "Il ne faut pas juger la Révolution russe sur ce qu'elle dit. Il faut voir ce qu'elle a fait. Il y a un abîme entre les mots et les actes." At times, especially in the last volume, the least satisfactory of the four, the author becomes somewhat ironic and expresses opinions about the Russians that one is loth to accept. But whether one agrees with his opinions or not, they are always intelligent. Taking it as a whole Anet's *Russian Revolution* is the best book on the subject that has come into the hands of the reviewer. It is the book for the historian.

F. A. GOLDER.

*Ambassador Morgenthau's Story.* By HENRY MORGENTHAU, formerly American Ambassador to Turkey. (Garden City: Doubleday, Page and Company. 1919. Pp. xv, 407. \$2.)

MR. MORGENTHAU has written one of the outstanding books of the four years of the Great War. Placed in a position where under the rules of diplomatic confidence he learned the thoughts and plans of the rulers of Turkey and to some extent, through his fellow ambassadors, of the leaders of the great European nations, he found his lips unsealed by the progress of events while his recollections, supported by careful notes, were still freshly in mind. Nine-tenths of his book is first-hand material, well selected and admirably stated. The pen-portraits of Enver, Talaat, and Wangenheim are masterpieces of vivid expression, as on a smaller scale are those of Bedri, Jemal, Pallavicini, Kühlmann, and others. The main lines of Turkish and German policy during the first year and a half of the war are set forth with great clearness and evidenced by indisputable facts. Especially noteworthy are the episodes of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, the naval attack on the Dardanelles, and the deportation and massacre of the Armenians. Making all due allowance for the collaboration of Mr. Burton J. Hendrick and others, Mr. Morgenthau re-

veals himself as a biographical and historical observer and narrator of a very high order. He furthermore contributes a number of large generalizations which will probably stand the test of time in the history of the Near East: as that Turkey was fundamentally brought into the Great War on the German side through fear of Russia, English support having disappeared after the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907; that the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, by the part they played in the final Turkish decision, probably exercised more influence than any other two ships in history; that the Turks, after the repulse of the Allies at the Dardanelles in March, 1915, were for the first time in generations able to act freely, and so to attempt the destruction of their Armenian subjects; that Bulgaria might until September, 1915, have been brought into the war on the Allied side, had her "unredeemed" territory in Macedonia been secured for her; that the closing of the Dardanelles and the keeping of them closed, by German intrigue, Turkish resistance, Allied hesitancy, and the over-running of Serbia, led to the collapse of Russia, the prolongation of the war, and the ultimate participation of the United States.

Mr. Morgenthau is not always as happy in narrating past events as in describing what he himself saw. The account given of the early Ottoman history (pp. 276-281) contains some statements which can be characterized only as fantastic: such as that the Turk of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries swept as a "wild horde . . . from the plains of Central Asia and, like a whirlwind, overwhelmed the nations of Mesopotamia and Asia Minor; it conquered Egypt, Arabia", etc.; that "these old Turks . . . had no alphabet and no art of writing; no books, no poets, no art, and no architecture"; that they reduced Mesopotamia to a desert "in a few years"; and that Turkey never was "an independent sovereignty" (p. 112).

Mr. Morgenthau also leans toward the common error of overemphasizing the importance of the field which he himself knows, as when he calls Turkey "the foundation of the Kaiser's whole political and military structure" (p. 1, English edition). Nor is it credible that Austrian and German statesmen could have expected in 1912 that Turkey would annihilate the forces of Serbia and destroy her as a nation.

But errors are remarkably few, while positive contributions of great value are many; especially valuable is the light obtained through the confidences of Wangenheim upon the German ideas on the terms of peace at different junctures (pp. 92, 175 ff., 389); the many observations on the Dardanelles campaign; and the detailed story of the Armenian deportation and massacres, with the attitude toward these of the Turkish and German statesmen in Constantinople.

The illustrations are numerous and well selected. The specially prepared maps are helpful; that on page 270, however, does not show correctly the territory ceded by Turkey to Bulgaria in 1915, since it omits the strips on the left bank of the Maritza.

ALBERT HOWE LYBYER.